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Explanatory accounts of the emergence, spread, storage, persistence, and transformation of
knowledge face numerous theoretical and methodological challenges. This paper argues that
although anthropologists are uniquely positioned to address some of these challenges, joint
engagement with relevant research in neighbouring disciplines holds considerable promise for
advancement in the area. Researchers across the human and social sciences are increasingly
recognizing the importance of conjointly operative and mutually contingent bodily, cognitive,
neural, and social mechanisms informing the generation and communication of knowledge. Selected
cognitive scientiﬁc work, in particular, is reviewed here and used to illustrate how anthropology may
potentially richly contribute not only to descriptive and interpretive endeavours, but to the
development and substantiation of explanatory accounts also.jrai_1617 193..202
In their various roles as perceivers, learners, recorders, communicators, and theorists of
knowledge, anthropologists have long recognized the central importance of bodily
experience in human knowledge. As learners of varied forms of cultural knowledge,
they maintain and demonstrate the importance of ‘being there’ as experiential partici-
pants and observers. As communicators of knowledge, they are challenged to transcribe
their experiences into forms of knowledge that are faithful to the richness of the data.
And as fully engaged participants in the myriad aspects of human behaviour across
variable cultural and learning contexts, anthropologists are uniquely positioned to
generate precise descriptive and theoretical accounts of the making of diverse kinds of
knowledge. The papers in this volume illustrate these aspects of ‘embodied’ anthropo-
logical inquiry, enhancing our appreciation not only of the diversity of learning envi-
ronments with which anthropologists now engage, but also of the challenges that any
explanatory account of knowledge-making faces.
Three challenges are especially clear. First, these papers conjointly demonstrate that
to address satisfactorily the broad framing questions, concerning ‘how we know’ and
‘how we come to know’, we need more than a single explanatory account. As the
contributors have so vividly shown, what we know takes many different forms. The
social and cognitive mechanisms and processes by which different forms of knowledge
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are generated are multiple, involve different activating conditions, and produce differ-
ent outcomes. Second, the generation of explanatory accounts of knowledge-making
across these diverse forms necessarily requires the joint engagement of multiple disci-
plines and modes of inquiry. If we truly aspire to understand ‘how we come to know’,
to espouse theories of knowledge acquisition, storage, retrieval, and communication
processes, and to account for the importance of bodily and mental states in learning
and performance, we simply cannot afford to ignore the vast and increasingly sophis-
ticated scholarship on such issues in neighbouring disciplines. Third, we need precise
empirical questions and testable hypotheses that are both generated from and genera-
tive of relevant data. The testing of precise hypotheses about the social and cognitive
mechanisms underpinning and facilitating the transmission of knowledge may not
immediately strike one as a particularly ‘anthropological’ challenge. Without clarity,
precision, and methodological rigour, however, theoretical claims ultimately remain
empirically intractable, unsubstantiated, and, therefore, of obscure value to the whole
enterprise.
Many more general observations could be listed. The challenges are great. In this
brief discussion, however, I will attempt to support these three observations, not simply
as a synoptic take-home message, but as a series of guiding principles for future
anthropological scholarship on human knowledge. Rather than abstract and address
each of the above three points in turn, I will demonstrate their inter-reliance in
practice, focusing on a central theme of this special issue, ‘How do bodily factors
influence the making of human knowledge?’ The preceding papers offer rich descrip-
tive analyses that point to the pervasiveness and centrality of ‘embodied knowledge’ in
cultural transmission, and that characterize the social complexity of transmissive pro-
cesses (see also Hutchins 1995; Lave 1988). But what of the mechanisms that establish
and channel such knowledge? To echo Downey, what are the material dimensions of the
learning process? How do these permit and constrain the transmission of culture? In
the space available, I will attempt to offer some general statements, partial answers, and
guiding principles relevant to these questions.
Grounded cognition
Cultural transmission – i.e. the emergence, acquisition, storage, and communication of
ideas and practices – is powerfully influenced by the physical context in which it occurs.
More specifically, what we know depends upon the brains, bodies, and environments in
and among which transmission occurs. Disciplines differ with regard to the variable
emphasis they place on neuro-cognitive, bodily, and social-historical factors in cultural
transmission. Increasingly,however, researchers across the human and social sciences are
recognizing that the bodily, cognitive, neural, and social mechanisms that permit and
constrain knowledge transmission are conjointly operative and mutually contingent.
In cognitive scientific models, the traditional view that knowledge resides neurally
independently of the mode-specific route by which it was acquired is gradually losing
ground. In recent years, a novel framework has emerged, which presents cognitive
processes such as perception, conception, attention, memory, and motivation, as
‘grounded’ in their physical context (Barsalou 2008). According to this view, knowledge
resides in modality-specific neuro-cognitive systems (e.g. those that process vision,
movement, audition, emotion, motivation, etc.) and is re-activated via the partial
simulation of the cognitive and bodily states, social interactions, and environmental
situations that contributed to its acquisition. For example, there is evidence to suggest
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that in order for pianists to identify whether a musical recording is of their own playing,
they tacitly and internally simulate the motor actions that compose the performance
(Repp & Knoblich 2004). Importantly, these recent approaches do not conflate brains,
bodies, and environments, or see all or any forms of knowledge as equivalently depen-
dent on each, but rather they recognize specific and varied causal linkages among them.
Specific body states, for example, have been shown to produce specific cognitive states
(e.g. the activation of smiling musculature by clenching of a horizontally aligned pencil
between one’s teeth produces positive affect), and specific social stimuli produce spe-
cific cognitive states (e.g. perceiving another’s laughter can produce positive affect in
self) (see Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey & Ruppert 2003).
How might this scholarship contribute to our understanding of the micromecha-
nisms underpinning human knowledge? The ethnographic analyses presented here
compellingly demonstrate the centrality of bodily states in the making of knowledge:
for example, in how learning to listen, learning to weave and embroider, and learning
to refine and attune one’s sense to a novel skill domain (Makovicky, Portisch, Rice,
Venkatesan). The complementary scholarship on grounded cognition, and investiga-
tions of implicit cognitive and behavioural phenomena, further indicate that cognitive,
affective, and bodily states are intimately interconnected across an exceedingly broad
and diverse range of knowledge forms. Research into the tacit linkages between con-
cepts and bodily states demonstrates that embodied knowledge pervades even basic-
level conceptual categorization. In a well-known study by Bargh, Chen, and Burrows
(1996), when social stereotypes associated with particular words were tacitly primed,
embodied effects were produced. Adults primed with the word elderly, for example,
took longer to walk from the laboratory to the elevator than adults in a control
condition. The priming of the stereotype associated with elderly, particularly the
assumption that the elderly tend to move slowly, appeared to generate corresponding
bodily effects in the participants. Similar effects were obtained in another study by
Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2002), in which participants were primed with the names of
fast or slow animals (such as cheetah or turtle).
Barsalou explains such effects in terms of what he calls ‘modal re-enactment’.
According to this account, knowledge is not stored in some sort of neural filing cabinet,
detached from the structures that are activated in its acquisition. Rather, the retrieval of
knowledge entails the partial re-enactment of the very situation(s) that led to its
encoding. Even retrieval of the most basic information pertaining to everyday objects
and entities entails simulation of the situation of ‘being there’ with those objects and
entities. Barsalou and colleagues, for example, asked research participants to produce
properties for objects that would typically be found either above them (e.g. bird) or
below them (e.g. worm). When producing properties for objects above them, partici-
pants were more likely to look up, and to lift their faces and hands upwards, than when
thinking about objects typically found below them (see Barsalou et al. 2003).
These findings, and those of an expanding body of evidence, support the view that
simulations underlie conceptual processing. In other words, the neural systems that
produce experiences are activated in their subsequent representation – the modality-
specific states activated by an affective, visual, and motor experience, such as a bungee
jump, are used in subsequent performances, descriptive commentaries, and so on, of
that experience. This account can help to explain why the re-description of such kinds
of experiences in propositional language fails adequately to communicate many of their
most keenly felt dimensions, or why in the everyday telling of jokes and stories we often
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end up resigning to the conclusion that ‘you had to be there’ (or succumbing to the
temptation to embellish).
Applying and developing theories, findings, and methodologies from this new
framework of ‘grounded cognition’, anthropologists can strive to identify more pre-
cisely how body, brain, and environment inform and constrain the making of knowl-
edge. What we mean by ‘embodiment’, as a term and perhaps even an ‘approach’ or
‘paradigm’ in anthropology, is all too frequently obscured in protracted chains of
metaphorical reinterpretation and re-formulation. Of course, the examination and
refinement of our analytical concepts are essential to establishing their interpretative
utility. If we wish not only to describe and interpret, however, but also to explain how
the body is implicated in knowledge acquisition, problematized concepts must even-
tually be supplemented with operationalized concepts. As Downey (this volume)
argues, to account for how knowledge is acquired, we need to engage with the organic
matter of the body, with specific material, physical, and neurological dimensions, and
how these impact perceptual, conceptual, behavioural, and social phenomena, and vice
versa. In his introduction, Marchand lists numerous scholars in the cognitive sciences,
including anthropology, who have already done so. Considerable scope exists for sus-
tained and more widespread involvement in such an enterprise.
Many anthropologists, of course, are uncomfortable with the idea of simply bor-
rowing findings from cognitive sciences on the factors contributing to patterns of
knowledge transmission. The relevant questions may not have been helpfully framed
and investigated, and sample populations used are often unrepresentative along various
important dimensions. Consequently, anthropologists are increasingly developing
their own – or collaborative – scientific research programmes born out of their field-
work observations (e.g. Astuti 2001; Astuti & Harris 2008; Barrett & Behne 2005).
Recognizing that factors underlying patterns of transmission observed may not readily
be discovered or confirmed through immersive participation and observation, direct
interview, and other standard ethnographic techniques, these anthropologists have
adapted and incorporated methods developed outside of anthropology that probe for
out-of-awareness knowledge and reasoning biases. Appreciating more fully the range of
factors – cognitive, social, environmental, etc. – that govern behaviour, anthropologists
can develop plausible accounts for patterns of behaviour that may otherwise remain
unsolvable puzzles. Allow me to illustrate with an example from my own work.
The cognition of possession
Following fieldwork with a group of Afro-Brazilian spirit mediums in Belém, northern
Brazil, numerous phenomena puzzled me as I reflected upon the behaviours and
statements of my research participants. One such puzzle concerned the apparent incon-
sistencies in the ways in which my friends in the field talked about and behaved around
possessed individuals. Possession (incorporação), I was frequently told, involves the
entry of a spirit into a person’s body, specifically the person’s head. When the spirit
comes into the person’s body, the person leaves, and where the person is thought to go
depends upon whom one asks. Some, for example, suggested that they lie down and
sleep; others said that they fly away; others said that they remain in the spot they were
at the moment the spirit entered their body. In contrast, there is a broad consensus on
what possession entails for the body and for the spirit. The spirit inhabits the body
temporarily, taking control of it and using it in the service of mediumistic activities,
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such as healing and counselling. Subsequent behaviours are said to be attributable to
the intentions, desires, and so on, of the spirit, not of the medium.
These descriptions of possession, however, often conflicted with observers’ com-
mentaries about particular behaviours in particular possession episodes. Mediums
were often teased for dancing or singing inadequately or for behaving inappropriately
while possessed. People’s interactions with mediums when possessed displayed striking
continuities with their interactions with mediums when puro, or not possessed. For
example, if a particular person harboured negative feelings toward a particular
medium, these attitudes appeared to influence behaviours toward that medium also
when possessed.
The community leader (pai-de-santo) once related a story in which a number of core
members (filhos-de-santo) committed severe infractions of the house rules while pos-
sessed. He described how four filhos, possessed with spirit entities, helped themselves to
alcoholic drinks that belonged to the house. The infraction was two-fold: consumption
of alcohol was strictly forbidden in the house, and the alcohol consumed on this
occasion was specifically and exclusively reserved for ritual libations to the spirit enti-
ties of the house. The pai-de-santo’s telling of the story revealed a certain level of
ambivalence about whom to blame – the filhos, or the spirit entities possessing them.
He began by naming names, not of spirit entities but of filhos. Then, he itemized his
reactions to the situation:
First, I think that it wasn’t necessary for the entities to do this. ‘Look, I want to drink – ah, it’s not ok
– alright then, I’ll go away’. Fine! Second, the entities know the regime of the house. Third, they were
stealing. Sure, this family [of spirits] is said to be fond of their drink, but ... I couldn’t get over it and
I’m still not over it.
Moments later, the blame seemed to be reside more in the direction of the filhos:
Look, the most important people of the house – in terms of hierarchy – were involved. The most
interesting thing is that the spirit entities know that these people cannot drink ... I just don’t
understand this at all.
And by the end of his record of the incident, it was quite clear that his disappointment
was chiefly with the filhos:
I thought that I was composing a stable, rigid, obedient society ... I thought that I could die in peace
– that the community would continue on, but now I do not have this assurance. If I die, what is going
to happen? ... I thought that I had a group of filhos-de-santo who were faithful, and sincere, but
unfortunately this was not the truth. A betrayal within a house means a lot to me, especially since I
have open communication [lit. ‘an open game’] with the filhos-de-santo.
An obvious question, then, concerns the ways in which various forms of knowledge,
at various levels of awareness, interact and inform one another in reasoning about
possession. Possession, in the abstract, entailed that the filhos were no longer present as
social agents, having been displaced from their bodies by incorporeal spirit entities. In
actual possession episodes, and real-time interpersonal interactions, however, it
appears that this abstract definition of possession did not consistently inform people’s
representations of agency, intentionality, and responsibility. Other anthropologists
have reported similar patterns, but few have attempted to explain precisely how these
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patterns arise. Niko Besnier, for example, states that ‘spirits and their world cannot be
understood through a search for a resolution of such ambiguities and contradictions;
rather, these qualities must be perceived as constitutive of the very nature of spirits’
(1996: 76, original emphasis).
I suggest that a range of cognitive scientific findings can facilitate the development
of an explanatory understanding of apparent contradictions in what people say, and in
what people do, not only in possession scenarios, but across variable social, cultural,
environmental, motivational, and emotional contexts. Explanations of such phenom-
ena are often hastily dismissed for their purported imposition of coherence and rigidity
on ‘fluid’, ‘shifting’, ‘complex’, and ‘conflictual’ cultural processes and discourses. Yet a
considerable and growing literature investigating how human psychology reacts with
bodily, social, and environmental stimuli now points to the presence of significant
constraints and predictable biases on human reasoning.
The perception and interpretation of possession scenarios are guided by a set of
implicit mental tools that deal with social perception in a broad range of interpersonal
contexts. Through further ethnographic and experimental research on the cognition of
possession, psychologist Justin Barrett and I discovered that the abstract definition
of possession – that entailing a displacement of the medium’s agency upon the entry of
the spirit – does indeed appear to be underpinned by strong cognitive biases. As a
result, the structure of this concept appears to be significantly more memorable, for
example, than comparable possession concepts (e.g. that entail the merging of host and
spirit agency in the host’s body). This may explain, in part, widespread incidence
cross-culturally of such displacement concepts (see Cohen & Barrett 2008a; 2008b).
In real-time perception of possessed individuals, however, a different set of cognitive
mechanisms is activated, biasing individuals toward alternative representations of pos-
sessed individuals. Neuroscientific and psychological evidence on the processes under-
pinning the perception of faces, for example, indicates that the observation of the face
of a known individual activates affective and semantic information that the observer
holds regarding that individual (Leveroni et al. 2000; Shah et al. 2001). Because the
pathway of activation – from systems involved in face perception, to those involved in
face recognition, and ultimately person recognition – is automatic, we cannot readily
attribute new identities to familiar faces. In our observations of how people represent
possession episodes, we should therefore expect ambivalence and ambiguity in what
observers say and do.
Drawing from our understanding of the implicit and explicit cognitive processes
involved in person recognition, novel predictions can be generated concerning the
variable importance of different bodily and behavioural cues for processes of person
perception in possession and related contexts (e.g. actor type-casting). What bodily and
behavioural transformations are likely to enable people more readily and consistently
to represent a person as ‘no longer present’ and their body as now inhabited by a
different identity? We might predict, for example, that the wearing of facial masks
would produce interestingly different effects from situations in which such accoutre-
ments are not used. What kinds of motivational and emotional factors, and other
interpersonal expectations, are important for explaining the ambivalence with which
the pai-de-santo understood the behaviour of the possessed filhos described above?
These questions are possibly interesting, but they are certainly tough to answer. How
people reason about possession is produced by the interaction of brain, body, and social
environment, and varies according to the ways in which elements of these three
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domains are differently configured across different contexts. This is not tantamount to
an incoherent and impenetrable chaos, however. The material properties of each of
these dimensions have variable, predictable, and often measurable effects on the
making, storage, retrieval, and communication of knowledge. Anthropologists cannot
always depend upon other disciplines to investigate how these dimensions contribute
to the patterns of behaviour and cultural transmission they observe. Rather, generating
plausible accounts of the complexities of knowledge-creation and -activation often
requires a concerted, collaborative interdisciplinary effort, and the sharing of method-
ological tools, data, and theoretical insights.
From ﬁeldwork to fMRI?
Talk of the centrality of bodies and brains in knowledge transmission, together with
appeals to neuro-cognitive theories on simulated re-enactments, and neuroscientific
evidence on person recognition processes, may give the impression that the explanatory
approach I am advocating necessarily requires that, at a certain point, we throw away
our notepads and pencils for expensive brain-scanning gadgetry and white coats. The
choice, however, is not between social, cultural, and historical phenomena, on the one
hand, and brain mechanisms, on the other; nor do traditional fieldwork methods and
flashy scanning methods even remotely constitute the complete battery of potentially
relevant techniques available. Conventional methods in the psychology of learning and
knowledge, including systematic observational techniques and eye-tracking, reaction-
time, implicit priming, and recall studies, are highly relevant to perennial anthropo-
logical concerns and questions about the transmission of culture.
Take imitation, for example. Imitative learning has been a central focus of research
in developmental psychology. Despite the richness and importance of findings in this
area, the neuroscientific discovery that imitative capacities are neurally grounded in a
specially dedicated class of brain cells, called mirror neurons, has fast become one of
cognitive science’s most successful exports to the social sciences. Mirror neurons have
received special attention, in particular, in discussions of skill acquisition and cultural
transmission more broadly (including in this collection). That they operate uncon-
sciously and automatically is often taken to suggest that learned motor behaviours are
simple emulations, or behavioural copies, of observed behaviours in others. Much of
cultural transmission is, by extension, explained in terms of what is, in effect, a high-
fidelity neural copy machine. Research with infants, however, suggests that imitation
does not consist only of re-enactments of demonstrated action. Rather, imitative
behaviours are frequently selective, and the inferential processing biases that govern
selection are firmly in place early in infancy.
In a series of simple but groundbreaking studies György Gergely, Gergely Csibra,
and colleagues first demonstrated not only that 12-month-old infants are able to
attribute goals to observed actions, but that they can also assess the efficiency with
which the goal is achieved via the specific act, and according to the physical constraints
upon the agent acting (Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra & Bíró 1995; Csibra, Gergely, Bíró,
Koós & Brockbank 1999). They then investigated whether considerations of efficiency
would influence 14-month-old infants’ imitative behaviours. In an adaptation of a
seminal study by Andrew Meltzoff, in which actions demonstrated by an adult actor
were re-enacted by infants after a one-week period, Gergely, Bekkering, and Király
(2002) showed that 14-month-olds tend to re-enact a goal-directed action only if they
perceive the action to be an effective means of achieving the intended goal. Infants
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watched an actor switch on a light box using her forehead. In one condition, the actor’s
hands were free while she executed the action, and in the other condition, her hands
were occupied (pretending to be cold, she had wrapped a blanket around herself, which
she held with both hands). Experimenters report a significant difference in the number
of infants who copied the demonstrated action between the two conditions. When the
demonstrator’s hands were free, 69 per cent of infants re-enacted the head action.
When the demonstrator’s hands were occupied, only 21 per cent of the infants copied
the head action, with the remainder choosing instead to turn on the light with their
hands. The experimenters conclude that ‘the early imitation of goal-directed actions is
a selective, inferential process that involves evaluation of the rationality of the means in
relation to the constraints of the situation’ (Gergely et al. 2002: 755).
Developmental studies such as these suggest that emulation – or simple behavioural
copying – is a component capacity in cultural learning, but that it is recruited alongside
additional cognitive capacities that enable us to detect goals and assess the relative
efficiency and relevance of variable routes to achieving those goals (all of which may be
facilitated through the activation of mirror-neuron circuits, see Barsalou 2008: 623;
Gallese, Keysers & Rizzolatti 2004). Where the functional rationale for a demonstrated
behaviour is unknown, however, actions are more likely simply to be emulated. This is
because, to the naïve observer, the relevant elements of the action may not be readily
distinguishable from the irrelevant components. Gergely and Csibra (2006) suggest
that selective transmission of relevant knowledge is enhanced by demonstrators, or
teachers, through a variety of what they call ‘ostensive-communicative cues’. Such cues
include eye contact, contingent reactivity, gaze shifting, pointing, behavioural demon-
stration, eyebrow flashing, and so on. Gergeley and Csibra propose a bilateral human-
specific pedagogical inclination to ‘teach’ each other, or to transmit relevant
information via the use of these ostensive cues, and to learn from each other, or to be
receptive to such cues (Gergely, Egyed & Király 2007). Such a ‘pedagogical stance’, if
borne out, would be an extremely important component of any account of cultural
transmission, and, indeed, of human sociality at large. Ethnographic evidence on
whether ostensive-communicative cues are as widespread as this view suggests will
surely be required to test these hypotheses. In those cultural contexts and learning
situations where ethnographers have reported the absence of direct propositional
teaching, do we none the less encounter a range of ostensive-communicative cues in
transmission? Is the repertoire of such ‘pedagogical tools’ broadly similar, and are there
recurrences in the patterns of activation of various components of the repertoire?
These tools and findings can demonstrate the relevance and importance of meth-
odological pluralism beyond fieldwork and brain scans. This issue is more than meth-
odological, however. By leaping from culture to brains and back, and bypassing the
cognition in between, we risk missing what is happening at the psychological and
behavioural levels. Explaining phenomena at the socio-cultural level in terms of the
patterns of activation of neurons in individual brains is analogous to explaining a
computer hardware failure in terms of the atomic structure of the materials of which it
is composed. It is at the level of the psychological mechanisms, processes, regularities,
and biases that constitute (and that may be constituted by) the individual and distrib-
uted ideas, expectations, intentions, behaviours, beliefs, feelings, attitudes, and so on,
that make up a socio-cultural environment that we will potentially discover factors that
meaningfully account for macro-cultural patterns. If we are to concentrate our col-
laborative efforts, then, in any domain of the broad aggregate of disciplines and
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specialisms that is cognitive science, an alliance with psychology is likely to be a
particularly fruitful one.
Because of the complexity of human culture, sociality, behaviour, and thought,
questions about the factors contributing to patterns of knowledge transmission are
rarely settled with any single set of tools or findings. How we come to know necessarily
entails complex and contingent interactions among brains, bodies, and environments.
There is an important role for anthropologists in identifying these interactions – not
only as sensitive interpreters of human behaviour, but as methodical describers of
human behaviour as it may be witnessed through a potentially broad variety of tech-
niques. The contributions to this volume offer both rich data and probing questions for
accounts of bodily knowledge, moving anthropology toward a position from which the
discipline can further its collaborative engagement with relevant theories and findings
in the cognitive sciences on cognition, embodiment, learning, and knowledge. As I have
attempted to argue, the generation of insightful interpretative analyses of behaviour
need not be the end-point of the ethnographic process. Faithful descriptions and
analyses can engender data-driven questions and hypotheses about the causal mecha-
nisms and processes that enable us to ‘come to know’. Ultimately, however, ‘being there’
and the importance of sustained participant-observation in the generation of descrip-
tive portrayals of human behaviour is powerfully upheld by emerging ‘grounded cog-
nition’ models of human knowledge. A rich understanding of local concepts and
categories as they inform ideas and practices, and the progressive departure from
exclusively ethnocentric (mis)understandings, is best achieved via direct and repeated
exposure to the linguistic, social, bodily, motivational, and affective contexts in which
these concepts and categories appear. The papers in this volume are surely strong
testimony to this fact.
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Anthropologie de la connaissance
Résumé
Les comptes-rendus portant sur l’émergence, la diffusion, la conservation, la persistance et la
transformation des connaissances se heurtent à de nombreuses difficultés théoriques et méthodologiques.
Bien que les anthropologues soient particulièrement bien placés pour affronter ces défis, des progrès
considérables pourraient être réalisés en la matière dans le cadre d’une approche conjointe avec des
disciplines voisines menant des recherches connexes. Les adeptes du décloisonnement des sciences
humaines et sociales reconnaissent de plus en plus l’importance des interactions et interdépendances entre
mécanismes physiques, cognitifs, neurologiques et sociaux dans la production et la communication des
connaissances. Des travaux scientifiques choisis, en matière de cognition en particulier, sont examinés et
utilisés pour illustrer la manière dont l’anthropologie pourrait apporter une riche contribution non
seulement aux tâches descriptives et interprétatives, mais aussi à l’élaboration et la mise à l’épreuve de
comptes-rendus explicatifs.
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